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Supreme Court Reverses Course On
Longstanding Antitrust Rule
Posted on December 1, 2007 by Editor
By Marisa N. James
The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a surprising decision in the antitrust field that changes
the pricing landscape for manufacturers and retailers. For almost 100 years, it has been
indisputably illegal for a manufacturer and its distributor to agree to set minimum resale prices.
(This is why you often see reference to the “MSRP” or “manufacturer’s suggested retail price.”)
In the recent case of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., however, the Court
reversed its position on this issue, instead ruling that the legality of such agreements should be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits monopolies and other unreasonable “restraints of trade.” In
most cases, whether a particular practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade is judged
by the “rule of reason,” which essentially means that the court or jury examines all the
circumstances to determine whether a practice is acceptable. However, the courts have
determined that some practices are nearly always unfair, so that those practices are necessarily,
or per se, illegal, and evidence about the circumstances of the practice is immaterial. For
example, “cartel” agreements among competing distributors to set minimum prices are per se
illegal because they almost always tend to restrain the free establishment of prices in the market.
In 1911, the Court considered the case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
which involved a manufacturer of medicines who would only sell to distributors who would agree
to sell the medicines at set prices. The Court found that this type of arrangement was per se
illegal, reasoning that it was analogous to an agreement among the distributors to establish a
minimum price.
This rule was in effect for almost 100 years. On June 28, 2007, however, the Court reconsidered
the legality of minimum resale price agreements in the Leegin case. Leegin is the manufacturer
of Brighton purses and other leather goods. Respondent PSKS operated a store called Kay’s
Kloset, which distributed Brighton products. When Kay’s Kloset refused to stop discounting
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Brighton products, Leegin stopped selling to the store. Kay’s Kloset then sued Leegin for violation
of antitrust laws based on the Dr. Miles case.
Writing for the majority (which also included Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito), Justice
Kennedy stated that practices should be considered per se illegal “only if courts can predict with
confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.”
Thus, if the negative economic impact of a practice is not immediately obvious, the per se rule
should not apply. In the case of minimum resale price agreements, the majority determined that
modern economists recognize that these agreements can actually enhance competition. In
particular, once retailers can no longer undercut each others’ prices, they tend to compete by
increasing their levels of service. Also, by guaranteeing the retailers’ profit margin, these
agreements can promote the entry of new manufacturers into the market by encouraging
retailers to invest in a new brand.
Thus, although the majority acknowledged that minimum resale price agreements can also have
anticompetitive effects, they determined that “it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence
that resale price maintenance ‘always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and
decrease output.’” Therefore, a per se rule invalidating the agreements was found to be
inappropriate; rather, in the future such agreements will be examined under the “rule of reason,”
on a case-by-case basis with regard to all of the circumstances of their use.
Notably, the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg, did not disagree that minimum resale price agreements could promote
competition. Rather, the dissenting Justices argued that there had been no change in conditions
that justified reversing such a longstanding antitrust rule.
In light of this ruling, this area of the law is likely to experience a period of uncertainty and
instability as courts are faced with different fact scenarios and develop corresponding rules and
standards for judging whether a particular minimum resale price agreement is an unlawful
restraint of trade. Distributors should expect manufacturers to experiment with new pricing
guidelines and requirements, but manufacturers should continue to be cautious about instituting
price requirements until the law is further developed.
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